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There is a plethora of criminological explanations why criminal violence increased during the three decades between the early 1960s and the early 1990s. 
This paper argues that most available interpretations are lacking in three respects: they lack a historical perspective that anchors the three critical decades 
in a wider understanding of long-term trends; they take the nation-state as their unit of analysis and disregard important commonalities across the Western 
world; and they pay insufficient attention to different trends in broad categories of physical violence.
This paper therefore takes a macro-level and long-term perspective on violent crime, focussing on European homicide during the past 160 years. It dem-
onstrates that the period of increase was preceded by a long-term decline and convergence of homicide rates from the 1840s to the 1950s. Also, it shows 
that both the decline and the increase primarily resulted from temporal variation in the likelihood of physical aggression between men in public space. It 
argues that explanations of these common trends need to take into account broad long-term cultural change common to Western societies. In particular, 
the paper suggests that shifts in culturally transmitted and institutionally embedded ideals of the conduct of life may provide an explanation for long-term 
change in levels of interpersonal violence.
Modernity Strikes Back? A Historical Perspective on the 
Latest Increase in Interpersonal Violence (1960–1990)
Manuel Eisner, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK 
Most criminologists agree that rates of violent crime such 
as robbery, assault, and homicide started to increase across 
the Western world sometime in the late 1950s or early 1960s 
and continued to do so for the next three decades until the 
early 1990s (e.g. Gurr 1981; LaFree 2005; Thome and Birkel 
2007). Yet the reasons for this have remained a mystery. Not 
that there is a lack of criminological explanations. Rather, 
there are too many and those that we have often contradict 
each other. The menu includes a rise in delinquent oppor-
tunities due to increasing wealth and time spent away from 
the family (Felson 1987); greater strain resulting from youth 
unemployment and lack of opportunities (Greenberg 1977); 
too much welfare state and the rise of an underclass (Mur-
ray 1994); too little welfare state and social exclusion (Young 
1999): institutional anomie resulting from the conflict be-
tween the ethos of material success and growing inequality 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 1994); excessive individualism due 
to a loss of communitarian values (Fukuyama 1999); and a 
loss of legitimacy of economic, social, and family institu-
tions (LaFree 1998).
A thorough discussion of these theories and the empiri-
cal evidence they rely on is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, it will take a broad view, arguing that many inter-
pretations of the late-twentieth century-rise in violent crime 
lack a historical perspective in the sense of anchoring the 
critical decades in a wider understanding of trends before 
and after. In contrast, the current analysis will extend the 
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time horizon back to the 1840s, a period that marks the 
beginning of a period of sustained decline in criminal vio-
lence across Europe. 
Indeed, several historians of crime have pointed out that the 
increase of violent crime in the second half of the twentieth 
century may have been a minor deviation from an even 
longer declining trend that may have prevailed over several 
centuries (Gurr 1981; Rousseaux 1999; Spierenburg 1996, 
2001). In particular, a patchwork of mediaeval and early 
modern estimates of homicide rates across Europe, col-
lected through meticulous archival work by historians of 
crime, suggests that homicide has become significantly less 
common over several centuries, probably starting in the 
late sixteenth century and continuing into the nineteenth 
century (for an overview of the empirical evidence see 
Eisner 2003). Theoretically, explanations of this trend have 
mainly relied on the seminal work of the sociologist Nor-
bert Elias, in particular his Theory of the Civilizing Process, 
first published in 1939 (Elias 1978). As is well known, the 
backbone of Elias’ Theory of the Civilizing Process is the idea 
that increasingly civilized behaviour is brought about by 
the interplay between two structural forces. The first is the 
century-long expansion of the state monopoly of power that 
led to increasing control over behaviour. The second force 
are the growing “chains of interdependence” brought about 
by market exchange and capitalism, which put a premium 
on peaceful interaction guided by self-interest. As a result, 
researchers influenced by the ideas developed by Elias ex-
pect an increasing sensitization to violence (Wiener 2004), a 
decline in harsh and cruel public punishment (Spierenburg 
1984), and a drop in interpersonal violence.
Faced with the observation of increasing violent crime dur-
ing the second half of the twentieth century, commentators 
of Elias’ work have suggested that this may merely reflect a 
short-term deviation, in the sense of a decivilizing process 
(Mennell 1990, 2001). However, from a perspective follow-
ing in the footsteps of Elias it is not entirely clear how such 
a decivilizing process came about in Europe in the midst of 
an expanding state, growing interdependence, and rela-
tive peace during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Indeed, one might argue that the notion of a decivilizing 
process is a different label for an increase in criminal vio-
lence rather than a genuine explanation.
This paper will therefore tentatively suggest a theoretical 
perspective that is based more on Max Weber than Norbert 
Elias. In particular, I will propose the notion of models of 
conduct of life, developed in Max Weber’s studies on the 
Protestant ethic (Weber 1920, 1982), as a useful theoretical 
tool for understanding macro-level variation in levels of 
criminal violence over time. Weber used the term Lebens-
führung to describe the distinctive ethos of a society or 
social group regarding the right way of living a life. Unfor-
tunately, the term has often misleadingly been translated 
into English as “life-style”, a term that wrongly evokes 
associations with fashion and leisure-time. In contrast, 
Lebensführung or conduct of life refers to a much wider cul-
tural script encompassing work, politics, beliefs, education, 
and individual character. These models of conduct of life 
become reinforced and stabilized through institutions such 
as schools, families, the church, and bureaucracies. In The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber argued 
that models of conduct of life can be enormously powerful 
forces that mould the details of daily action and shape the 
trajectories of economic life. In a similar vein, I will argue 
that the major shifts in levels of interpersonal criminal 
violence over the past 160 years were associated with broad 
changes, across Europe, in shared cultural models of what 
constitutes a desirable and good “conduct of life”. These are 
said to influence levels of interpersonal violence through 
their effects on patterns of socialization as well as by affect-
ing expectations about adequate interaction in daily situa-
tions, especially in public space.
The paper is organized in three parts. In the first part I will 
introduce the History of Violence Database and present the 
data upon which the empirical analysis will be based. The 
second part will provide an overview of the main trends in 
homicide rates across western and central Europe between 
1840 and 2005, based on data from seventeen countries. The 
third part will discuss three main trend periods and puta-
tive factors that may have been causally relevant. 
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1. The Data
The subsequent discussion will present national time-series 
of homicide rates covering seventeen European countries 
over a period of up to 160 years, i.e. from about 1840 to the 
present. To my knowledge, it is thus based on the most com-
prehensive collection of long-term national homicide rates 
in Europe to date. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the seventeen countries that are 
included in the collection as well as the time-periods cov-
ered and the main data-source used. It shows that the data 
comprise most of western Europe while there are large gaps 
for Eastern Europe including, e.g. Poland, Russia, or Greece.
Table 1: National series of homicide rates in the history of violence database: Time periods and countries currently covered
Country Time periods currently covered1 Number of years Main type of source2
Austria (before 1918 Austrian part  
of Austro-Hungarian Empire)
1862–85, 1923–35, 1947–2003 94 Conviction and mortality statistics
Belgium 1870–1913, 1919–1997 123 Mortality statistics
Denmark 1921–2001 81 Mortality statistics
England and Wales 1833–2002 170 Police statistics
Finland 1754–2003 250 Mortality statistics
France 1827–1920, 1925–2003 162 Judicial statistics and Mortality statistics
Germany (before 1871 Prussia) 1836–1914, 1948–2004 146 Mortality statistics
Hungary (before 1918 Hungarian  
part of Austro-Hungarian Empire)
1882–87, 1923–32, 1950–2003 70 Judicial statistics and mortality statistics
Ireland 1842–1918, 1926–2002 154 Police statistics
Italy 1875–2003 129 Police statistics and Mortality statistics
Netherlands 1900–2004 105 Mortality statistics
Norway 1876–2003 128 Mortality statistics
Portugal 1950–2000 51 Mortality statistics
Scotland 1858–2003 123 Police statistics
Spain 1883–1918, 1947–2002 92 Judicial statistics and mortality statistics
Sweden 1754–2001 248 Mortality statistics
Switzerland 1877–2001 125 Mortality statistics
Notes:
1. As of April 2006.
2. See Appendix for more detailed information about the sources. 
Additionally, the database includes disaggregated series for 
infanticide and for male and female victims whenever they 
were available over sufficiently long periods of time. Also, 
for two countries (England and Wales, Switzerland) there 
are series broken down by age and sex of the victim. Finally, 
contextual data on the age distribution of offenders, the 
modus operandi, or regional differences within countries 
are added on an ad-hoc basis where found during research 
in historical publications. These data convey additional 
information about long-term change in contextual charac-
teristics of homicide, which may provide important clues 
about underlying causal dynamics. 
A mix of three strategies was used to collect the data, 
namely reviewing previous publications, retrieving data di-
rectly from official statistical publications, and approaching 
scholars and statistical offices for information and specific 
data. 
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The earliest study of cross-national homicide series was 
probably the one conducted by the Italian criminologist Au-
gusto Bosco in 1889. Beyond being an excellent analytical 
piece of work, it provides series of data of police recorded 
or adjudicated homicides for various countries. Another set 
of national series was published a few years later in Enrico 
Ferri’s L’omicidio-suicidio (1894) and updated in 1925 (Ferri 
1925). For Scandinavian countries the most comprehensive 
source of long-term data is the work by Verkko initially 
published in 1931 in Finnish and later partly translated 
into German and English (Verkko 1937, 1951, 1967). Besides 
providing a detailed methodological discussion, Verkko 
presents complete series of homicides and infanticides ac-
cording to the Swedish and Finnish cause of death statistics 
from 1754 to 1920. The most important recent major study 
on homicide trends is by LaFree and Drass (2002) covering 
forty-four countries over the years 1950–2000. It uses the 
mortality statistics compiled annually by the World Health 
Organization, overall the most valid and reliable source for 
more recent cross-national comparative homicide data.
Although these studies provided valuable insight, efforts 
were made to trace the data back to original official pub-
lications, in order to better understand what definition 
of homicide and what source had been used. Also, using 
original publications was the best way to ensure consistency 
of data collection over time and to trace possible changes in 
reporting or recording routines. Sometimes the data could 
be found in national statistical yearbooks, but often more 
specialized governmental publications had to be consulted. 
Specialists in national statistics offices were often helpful in 
providing access to data and explaining differences between 
alternative sources. Also, for some countries specialist 
scholars provided most valuable information, including 
permission to integrate their data in this database. I am es-
pecially grateful to Ian O’Donnell for his series of homicides 
in Ireland from 1841–2001, to Martti Lehti for providing me 
with series of data on Finland, and to Gary LaFree for the 
dataset on cross-national homicide rates from 1950–2000. 
2. Methodological Issues
Analyses of long historical series of homicide rates are 
invariably confronted with two key questions: Do available 
data reflect real levels of criminal homicide? And is homi-
cide an indicator of serious interpersonal violence more 
generally? I briefly explore both questions before moving on 
to the substantive findings. 
Measurement objectives. The conceptual target variable of 
this study is criminal homicide. It is commonly defined as 
the intentional killing by a human being of another human 
being and comprises murder, manslaughter, and infanti-
cide. By conventional standards this includes deaths due to 
injuries received in a fight, argument, quarrel, or assault, or 
during the committing of a crime – although in these cases 
the intention usually is not to kill a person but to inflict 
injuries. However, it excludes deaths inflicted by persons 
while acting within legitimate rules on behalf of the state 
(i.e. killing during war, executions, police officers while on 
duty) and it does not include accidental deaths (e.g. traffic 
accidents).  
Most researchers now agree that homicide data are the most 
reliable and valid indicators for conducting comparative 
analyses between countries and over time (e.g. Marshall and 
Block 2004). There are several reasons for this. Homicide 
is similarly defined across countries and time, reporting is 
believed to be more complete than for any other crime, and 
recording by authorities is particularly scrupulous. But like 
other measures of crime, the fewer the procedural stages 
between the actual recording and the production of the sta-
tistics, the more likely data are to reflect actual occurrence. 
In this respect, police statistics and mortality statistics are 
generally assumed to be superior to conviction statistics. 
They are hence the preferred data source for this study.
Police statistics report homicides known to the police, 
usually meaning that prima facie evidence suggests an 
intentional killing of a person. Depending on a country’s 
legal framework, figures may be broken down by legal 
subcategories such as infanticide, murder, and manslaugh-
ter. Mortality statistics, on the other hand, are based on the 
death certificates completed by the coroner, pathologist, or 
surgeon. Classification as homicide implies that the death 
is believed to have been the result of an intentional act. As 
a rule, the verdict is based on an inquest that reflects the 
available forensic evidence.
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Theoretically, both sets of data should be strongly cor-
related because a coroner’s verdict of “homicide” requires 
further criminal investigation while a corpse found by the 
police should always lead to a forensic inquest. Yet differ-
ences may occur for various reasons other than slippage in 
record-keeping: First, the territorial reference differs as the 
police count events that happen in a country while mortal-
ity statistics register events that happen to the residential 
population of a country. Second, police statistics record the 
year when the crime became known while mortality statis-
tics count the year when the death occurred. Third, police 
records and death certificates are not necessarily completed 
at the same time and the legal assessment of the death may 
have changed between both procedures.
The extent of overlap can be assessed in countries where 
statistical series from both recording systems are available 
over longer periods of time. Table 2 shows a sample of cor-
relations between police and mortality statistics for selected 
periods and countries. The correlations are between r = 
.83 and r = .92 suggesting a good fit between series derived 
from the two sources. 
Table 2: Bivariate correlations between homicide rates according to mortality 
statistics and according to police statistics, selected countries and periods
Country and data Correlation
Finland: Police recorded homicides versus  
mortality statistics, 1951–2000
.83
Sweden: Police recorded completed homicide versus  
mortality statistics, 1950–2000
.92
Italy: Police recorded homicide, incl attempt versus  
mortality statistics, 1950–1986
.91
England: Police recorded homicide versus  
mortality statistics, 1872–1998
.91
This corresponds with research in the United States (Can-
tor and Cohen 1980; Rokaw, Mercy, and Smith 1990) and 
Australia (Mouzos 2003) where a good overall fit between 
mortality statistics and police data has been documented. 
Similarly, Birkel and Thome (2004) found correlations 
of .80–.95 between police and mortality statistics for the 
 second half of the twentieth century in Germany, England 
and Wales, and Sweden.
Advantages of mortality statistics. However, in several 
respects mortality statistics are generally superior to police 
statistics for assessing long-term trends across nations. 
The essential pragmatic reason is that historically they are 
more widely available than police statistics (see Table 1). 
But there are also more substantive advantages. One is that 
classification in mortality statistics is based on medico-legal 
criteria that have remained relatively stable over time. In 
particular, “homicide” has always been a distinct category 
in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) since 
its inception in 1900, being defined as “death resulting from 
an injury intentionally inflicted by another person” (for an 
overview of the history of the ICD see Israel 1978). But even 
before 1900 “homicide” was a standard category in mortal-
ity statistics, reflecting the fact that it distinctly required 
legal action to be taken. 
Also, death statistics are less amenable to changing legal 
frameworks than police data. For example, the legal defini-
tion of “infanticide” varies significantly between countries 
and over time. Some countries subsume it under murder 
and manslaughter, others have specific provisions but with 
varying content. In contrast, the statistical definition as the 
intentional killing of a child below age one is much more 
universally applicable. Finally, as mentioned, mortality data 
often provide information on the sex and age-group of the 
victims, which makes it possible to examine trends for dif-
ferent types of homicide separately. 
However, one should also note two limitations of mortality 
statistics (that equally apply to police statistics): The first is 
that mortality data are probably incomplete for some sub-
types of homicide and that the extent of under-coverage is 
likely to have changed over time. A pertinent example is 
infanticide. It is almost certainly not fully documented in 
nineteenth century statistics as concealment was relatively 
easy, because midwives sometimes condoned the acts of 
desperate women, and because forensic technology was not 
always able to distinguish intentional killing from natural 
death due to suffocation (L. Rose 1986). 
The second problem is that mortality statistics reflect the 
expert assessment before the case is fully investigated and 
a legal decision is returned. The category of “homicide” 
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may therefore contain a proportion of cases that are finally 
found not to have been an intentional killing. To account 
for this uncertainty some countries (e.g. England and 
Wales, Scotland) have created dynamic databases that up-
date the legal classification as the investigation progresses. 
England and Wales, where a dynamic database was intro-
duced in 1976, is an interesting case because it produces 
two sets of data that operate according to opposite logics. 
The Criminal Statistics operate according to a subtractive 
logic. They collect data on “initially recorded” homicides of 
which 10–15 percent become eventually reclassified as hav-
ing had some other cause (Home Office 1999). The mortality 
statistics, in contrast, operate according to an additive logic. 
Cases of likely homicide are initially coded under a specific 
category “verdict pending” (ICD-classification E988.8 in 
ICD-9, Y33.9 in ICD-10) and only become classified under 
one of the homicide categories of the ICD when the final 
verdict is known. While the two datasets produce highly 
diverging numbers during any current year, their estimates 
converge two or three years later (Rooney and Griffiths 
2004).
Homicide rates and broader violence trends. Homicide rates 
can certainly be analysed in their own right. But are they 
also an indicator of criminal violence in a wider sense? To 
explore this question, Hofer (2000) examined the relation-
ship between the long-term trend in homicide rates as 
measured in the Swedish mortality statistics and the rate of 
convictions for assault according to court statistics dur-
ing 1841–1998. Although there are short-term deviations 
between the two series (i.e. over 5–10 years), the long-term 
trends show a remarkable extent of co-variation. Other 
studies examining the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries also generally find good correspondence between 
homicide trends and broader violence indicators (e.g. Ga-
trell 1980; Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula 1977). 
For shorter periods the most conclusive evidence relates to 
the United States. There the annual National Crime Victim 
Survey (NCVS) provides good estimates of change in the 
risk of being assaulted since 1974. Over the period 1974 to 
2002 the correlation between assault as measured in the 
NCVS and homicide rates is r = .91, suggesting that in the 
United States homicide does reflect wider change in violent 
behaviour (Langan 2005). Similar comparisons between 
trends in victim surveys and homicide data in Europe are 
less conclusive (Tonry and Farrington 2005), but they are 
based on shorter time spans and often on smaller survey 
samples than the U.S. National Crime Victim Survey. It is 
hence probably fair to say that the question of how closely 
change in levels of homicide is indicative of more general 
trends in violence is not fully resolved. 
There are two main reasons why the ratio between non-
lethal interpersonal violence and homicide may vary over 
long periods of time, namely change in technologies of kill-
ing and in technologies of healing. By technologies of killing 
I mean the destructive effectiveness of instruments in the 
hands of those who are capable and willing to use them. 
Where effective instruments such as swords or guns are 
readily available to people with a given level of propensity 
to engage in aggressive acts, a lethal outcome becomes more 
likely (Zimring and Hawkins 1998). 
It is difficult to assess how technologies of killing have 
affected trends in homicide rates over the past 150 years. 
Firearms have become more precise and easier to conceal, 
whereas, at the same time, governments across Europe 
have put increasing controls on their availability. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the Gun Licence Act of 1870 
introduced a fee to be paid by anybody wishing to carry 
a firearm “outside the curtilage of his dwelling house” 
(Greenwood 1972, 17). The first effective restrictions were 
established by the 1920 Firearms Act, which, however, still 
considered self-defence a good reason to possess a firearm. 
This exception was eliminated in the early 1960s, followed 
by further legal efforts, culminating in the 1990s, at more 
effectively restricting access to firearms (Malcolm 2002).
Technologies of healing comprise the communication, 
transport, and medical technologies that influence the 
likelihood that a wounded person will die from the injuries. 
This includes telephones to contact emergency services, 
ambulances to bring a person to a hospital, and the medical 
expertise to operate on gunshot and stab wounds. Tech-
nologies of healing have dramatically advanced over the 
last two hundred years. For example, Monkkonen (2001a) 
finds that up to two thirds of nineteenth century victims of 
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homicide in New York suffered at least several hours before 
they died, the likelihood being that many of them would 
be rescued with contemporary technology. Also, Harris et 
al. (2002) estimate that US completed homicide rates in the 
late 1990s might have been up to three times higher than 
they actually were, had medical technology remained at the 
same level as it was in 1960.
Overall, the shifting interplay between the technologies of 
killing available to motivated offenders and the technolo-
gies of healing in the hands of medical experts must have 
affected the odds of a fight, a robbery, or a sexual assault 
resulting in a person’s death. However, more research would 
be needed to express such change in more precise ways over 
longer periods of time. 
The denominator. Homicide rates are usually computed 
as the total number of cases in a year for every 100,000 
members of the national population. This is not without 
problems since the age distribution of offenders and victims 
differs significantly from the age structure of the total 
population. In most societies, for example, offender rates 
peak at age 20–35. Societies with a younger population 
may hence have elevated homicide rates simply because a 
larger proportion of the population is in the high-risk age 
bracket. For comparative purposes it is desirable, therefore, 
to control for differences in the age structure by comput-
ing age-standardized homicide rates (Monkkonen 2001b). 
However, this requires age-specific data for both offenders 
and victims, which are rarely available over long historical 
periods. In the current data-set such data could be found for 
two countries (England and Wales, Switzerland). Comput-
ing age-standardized victimization rates suggests that the 
deviations from unstandardized rates are relatively small 
and do not affect the substantive conclusions. For these 
reasons all homicide rates are based on the total population 
as the denominator. 
3. What has happened? An overview
The historical reference period of the subsequent analyses 
starts in 1840, although the national series for Finland and 
Sweden go back almost another 100 years. There are two 
reasons for this, one being that 1840 is the earliest period 
for which the database provides national series for a size-
able sample of European countries (England and Wales, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Prussia, Scotland, and Sweden), 
meaning that generalizations about trends can be based on 
a reasonably large evidence base.
Secondly, homicide rates in Finland and Sweden increased 
noticeably from about 1770 to 1840 and evidence suggests 
possible increases elsewhere in Europe as well (Hofer 1991; 
King 2006). This increase comes to a halt around 1840 
meaning that this decade probably constitutes a turning-
point in the long-term development of homicide rates.
I present the data in two complementary ways. Figure 1 
shows sixteen national series for periods of up to 160 years 
combined in one cluster of graphs. The main purpose here 
is to provide an idea of the shared underlying trajectory that 
has characterized the development of homicide in Europe 
as a whole. 
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Figure 1: Overall homicide rates in sixteen European countries, per 100,000, three-year moving averages
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Notes:
The figure includes data for Austria (1862–1885, 1923–1935, 1947–2003), Belgium (1870–1997), Denmark (1921–2001), England and Wales (1840–2002), France (1840–2002), Prussia/
Germany (1840–1913, 1947–2003), Ireland (1841–2001), Italy (1875–2001), Norway (1877–2002), Netherlands (1931–2002), Scotland (1847–2000), Spain (1883–1917, 1947–2001) Sweden 
(1840–2002), Switzerland (1877–2001). Finland is excluded because it has unique trends in homicide rates.
For sources see Appendix 1. 
Periods excluded for Belgium (1914–1918, 1942–45), France (1942–45), Italy (1942–45), Netherlands (1942–1945), Norway (1940–1945).
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Table 3: Average homicide rates in seventeen European countries, 1840–2004
Year
1840– 
49
1850– 
59
1860– 
69
1870– 
79
1880– 
89
1890– 
99
1900– 
09
1910– 
19
1920– 
29
1930– 
39
1940– 
49
1950– 
59
1960– 
69
1970– 
79
1980– 
89
1990– 
99
2000– 
04
England 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7
Scotland 2.9 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.1
Ireland 4.0 3.7 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.5
Sweden 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.0
Norway - - - - - - 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.0 0.9
Denmark - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.1
Belgium - - - - - - 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.2 1.6 1.6 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.6 1.7 - -
Netherlands - - - - - - - - - - 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.2
France 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.8
Germany 2.8 2.3 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.4 2.1 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.7
Austria 2.4 2.6 2.2 - - - - - - 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.2 0.8
Italy - - - - - - 6.8 6.2 5.1 3.9 3.3 4.3 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.2
Switzerland - - - - 3.7 3.0 2.8 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.1
Spain - - - - - - - - 9.1 6.8 8.2 5.3 - - - - 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.0
Portugal - - - - - - 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.0
Finland 3.2 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.0 4.8 12.3 9.5 7.0 4.0 2.6 2.2 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.5
Hungary - - - - - - 7.6 - - - - - - 3.1 4.9 - - - - - - - - 2.6 3.5 2.3
Mean1 - - - - - - 2.51 2.31 2.09 1.81 1.56 1.47 1.06 0.99 0.79 0.77 1.02 1.33 1.43 1.29
Std. dev. 1.78 1.58 1.27 1.00 0.88 1.16 0.46 0.50 0.40 0.25 0.27 0.34 0.40 0.45
1. Unweighted mean of England&Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland.
Table 3, in contrast, shows the average rates per country 
and decade for the period 1840–2003, with data arranged 
by geographical proximity. Furthermore, the table presents 
two summary indicators. The first is a European average 
for each decade from the 1880s onwards. It is based only on 
those countries that have relatively complete series of data 
from 1880 to 2000 (England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland, 
Sweden, Norway, Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland). The 
average is not weighted by population size. The second in-
dicator shows the standard deviation of the homicide rates 
for each decade from the 1880s to the 2000s. The standard 
deviation can be interpreted as a measure of the average 
amount of “variability” of homicide rates in a comparison 
across countries at a given point in time.
Three methodological notes should be considered when 
interpreting these figures. First, all data include infanticide 
since consistently separating infanticide is currently only 
possible for a limited number of countries. 
Second, during the last years of World War II both police 
recorded homicides and homicides recorded in mortality 
statistics soared in most occupied countries. A consider-
able part of the increase probably reflects partisan fighting 
against the German occupying forces and collaborators. But 
there may also have been a rise in conventional violence due 
to the breakdown of the state monopoly of power between 
the collapse of German administration and the reestablish-
ment of regular policing after the end of the war (Rous-
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seaux, Vesentini, and Vrints 2008). These periods need to be 
analysed separately and I therefore decided not to include 
them in the graphs and figures. 
Third, Finland is not included in Figure 1 and not incorpo-
rated in the calculation of European averages and standard 
deviations in Table 3, although the respective national 
figures are shown in the table. The reason is that Finland 
has long been known to have both unusually high con-
temporary homicide rates and an atypical long-term trend 
in comparison with the rest of Europe (LaFree and Drass 
2001). In particular, starting from already high average lev-
els at the turn of the twentieth century, Finland experienced 
a “homicide wave” between about 1905 and 1935 leading up 
to rates averaging above 8 per 100,000 (Lehti 2001). Hence 
Finland was treated as an “outlier” since the main purpose 
of synthesizing the data was to illustrate the main shared 
trajectories across western Europe. 
One might doubt the utility of combining sixteen national 
series in one single figure. However, the rationale is that 
the figure visualizes a number of important characteristics 
of the long-term trajectory across western Europe—while 
intentionally toning down the specificities of individual 
countries. More particularly, it suggests three main periods: 
The first period roughly comprises the century between the 
1850s and the 1950s and is described by the twin processes 
of decline and convergence. A second period comprises the 
three decades between the early 1960s and the early 1990s. 
During these thirty years homicide rates across Europe fol-
lowed a joint upward trend, with national differences in any 
given year within a very narrow band. A third period starts 
in the early 1990s when homicide rates return to a declining 
trend in most European countries. 
4. 1850–1960: Decline and convergence
All national series included in Figure 1 followed a declining 
trajectory in the second half of the nineteenth century that 
continued until about 1950. This is documented for indi-
vidual countries as well as for the averages shown in Table 
3. For nine countries with continuous series since the 1880s 
the average homicide rate is about 2.4 per 100,000 in the 
1880s and drops to about 0.8 in the 1950s. 
This is a significant decline, which has been found to cor-
respond to a wider fall in interpersonal criminal violence. 
In Sweden (Hofer 2000), Germany (Johnson 1995: 127), and 
England and Wales (Gatrell 1980) similar declining trends 
are documented for broader categories of recorded violence 
such as assault or robbery. This is particularly noteworthy, 
as police forces grew and record-keeping became more pro-
fessional over the century – factors that would, if anything, 
have inflated crime statistics. 
The second major characteristic of this period is conver-
gence, visually represented by the inverted fan pattern in 
Figure 1 (see also LaFree 2005). This is documented sta-
tistically in the decline of standard deviations in Table 3, 
but one may also think of it in terms of the range of rates. 
Around 1880 national homicide rates varied by an factor 
of 1:10 between countries, ranging from a low of about 0.8 
in Scotland to about 8.0 in Italy. By 1950, the range had 
dwindled to a ratio of 1 to 4. 
A closer look at individual countries reveals where the 
convergence comes from. By around 1880 most countries in 
the northern and western Europe, primarily England and 
Wales, Scotland, Sweden, Norway, and France, already had 
low homicide levels. In contrast, countries in southern Eu-
rope – Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria – still recorded 
significantly more homicides. Indeed, regional maps by 
Ferri (1895, 285ff) suggest that particularly high homicide 
rates continued to prevail in a rim of areas on the outskirts 
of Europe, including the rural areas of Spain, the southern 
rim of France, Corsica, the mountain valleys of Switzerland, 
the south of Italy, Greece, the eastern parts of the Austro-
Hungarian empire, the eastern provinces of Prussia, and 
– although at lower overall levels – the border areas between 
England and Scotland. By 1950 these differences had mostly 
disappeared as a result of the fast decline in homicide rates 
in those peripheral areas where they had been highest sev-
enty years earlier. 
Upon closer inspection it also seems possible to tentatively 
distinguish three main groups of neighbouring countries 
with similar variations of the trend. 
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Figure 2: The northern European pattern for homicide trends (per 100,000, 3-year moving averages)
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Figure 3: The continental European pattern for homicide trends (per 100,000, 3-year moving averages)
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Figure 4: The southern European pattern for homicide trends (per 100,000, 3-year moving averages)
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One group is the British Isles, Norway and Sweden with 
very similar trends of gradual, uninterrupted moderate de-
cline between 1840 and 1950. A second is France, Belgium, 
and Germany, where homicide rates were significantly 
lower in the 1950s than at the beginning of the series but 
rose between about 1885 and the beginning of World War I. 
A third group are countries in southern Europe including 
Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and most probably also 
Greece, where homicide rates were much higher in the mid-
nineteenth century and the decline was particularly steep. 
Differences by sex and age of the victims. Data on victim 
characteristics such as age and sex provide important addi-
tional information about which types of homicide contrib-
uted most to the overall decline. Whereas overall national 
statistics are available for many countries, the data-set cur-
rently only comprises series with detailed victim categories 
for Switzerland, Sweden, and England and Wales. They 
reveal two main dynamics.
First, they suggest that the overall decline was mainly a de-
cline in male-on-male violence. In Switzerland, for example, 
the ratio of male to female victims dropped from 2:1 in the 
1880s to 1:1 in the 1950s. Over the same period the ratio in 
Sweden fell even more, from 3:1 to 1:1. The same is true for 
England where findings by Wiener (2004, 167) provide addi-
tional insight. From the 1860s to 1900 he finds that the over-
all decline in murder cases was composed of two trends: the 
rate of wife murder remained more or less stable while there 
was a disproportionate decrease in murder other than wives 
– overwhelmingly situations of men killing men. 
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Secondly, a disproportionate part of the decline was due to 
a reduction amongst victims aged 20–29 and 30–39. In Swit-
zerland, for example, mortality statistics show a distinctive 
age curve for male victims in the 1875–84 period. The risk 
was highest in the 20–29 age group with a homicide rate of 
7.1 per 100,000 and declined with increasing age to about 
3.1 in the 60–69 age-group. Looking at male victimization 
eighty years later (1955–64) one can see a massive decline 
for all age groups, but by far the greatest decline amongst 
younger men. Amongst men at ages 20–29 the homicide 
rate was now a mere 0.4 per 100,000, which equals an as-
tounding reduction by 94 percent over the period. 
Data on more countries would be important, but I hypoth-
esize that they would corroborate the same underlying 
trend: the bulk of the decline across Europe was a reduction 
in young men getting killed (Verkko 1967). What happened 
was primarily the pacification of interactions between male 
non-relatives in the public sphere. Across Europe, this 
change comes in different guises and affects various mani-
festations of interpersonal violence. In the south of Europe, 
rural banditry was still endemic in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. It was widespread, for example, in the rural-pastoral 
societies of Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, and Greece (Gallant 
1997, 2000; Wilson 1988). In these areas, banditry was as-
sociated with other manifestations of violence, in particular 
feuding and blood revenge, themselves part of a culture of 
honour. By 1950 such manifestations of an archaic code of 
honour had not completely disappeared, but their occur-
rence had become massively reduced. 
North of the Alps the code of honour, feuding and revenge 
already belonged to a relatively distant past by the mid-
nineteenth century. However, there were other spheres of 
public interaction where violence was still common round 
the mid-nineteenth century and disappearing over the 
course of the long-term decline. Probably the most visible 
sphere here is public enjoyment. Prize fighting, for example 
was a common sport amongst working-class Englishmen 
in the first half of the century that became increasingly 
controlled and eventually eliminated as the century went 
on (Wiener 2004). Football, along with various other male 
sports, only gradually became the rule-bound game we 
know today. Also, male fights and brawls related to alcohol 
consumption declined throughout Europe. 
Interpretive issues. Several authors have already described 
the decline in criminal violence and homicide across Eu-
rope during the second half of the nineteenth and the first 
half of the twentieth century (Chesnais 1992; Gatrell 1980; 
Gurr 1976; Hofer 1991). Although the details of precisely 
where, when, and why it occurred are still poorly under-
stood, researchers agree that it was a remarkable phenom-
enon that requires an explanation.
It is worth recalling at this point that the drop in homicide 
rates is set within a period of enormous social and econom-
ic change (for statistical indicators see, e.g. Flora et al., 1983). 
In 1850 most people across the continent were still working 
in agriculture, few cities had more than 100,000 inhabit-
ants, and transportation of people or goods over land was 
mainly by foot, cart, or coach; large parts of the population 
constantly faced absolute poverty and struggled to produce 
enough to feed their families; 10–25 percent of newborns 
died within a year and average life expectancy was around 
forty, barely above the average typical throughout the early 
modern period. One hundred years later Europe was a 
different world in almost every respect: most people now 
lived in cities and the tertiary sector was about to overtake 
employment in the industrial sector; trains and cars had 
revolutionized transport while radio and telephone had 
annihilated distance as a barrier to communication; life 
expectancy was close to seventy and infant mortality was 
reduced to 2–3 percent. 
Never before in human history had people been exposed 
to such a relentless stream of technological, economic, and 
social change; and there was no precedent to the modern 
society that emerged out of it. Would it not be plausible to 
assume that humans would react with increased interper-
sonal violence to the resulting strains? We know that they 
have not. None of the putative side-effects of industrial 
modernity – the loss of cultural traditions, the knowledge 
revolution, the growth of cities, migration, or repetitive 
factory work – had a noticeable negative effect on crimi-
nal violence. If anything, modernity was associated with 
decreasing homicide. 
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For these reasons some older versions of modernization 
theory which assume that the long-term dynamics of 
modernization and urbanization necessarily bring about 
social disorganization, alienation, and anomie (which in 
turn breeds crime) can be discarded, because they make 
predictions in the wrong direction (Clinard and Abbott 
1973; Szabo 1960). Shelley (1981) in contrast, has developed 
a more complex criminological modernization theory. In a 
nutshell, she argues that violent crimes only rose during the 
most unsettling early stages of industrialization (i.e. before 
about 1840), but ceded their pre-eminent place to property 
crimes as the recently arrived rural migrants adjusted to 
city life (Shelley 1981, 36). Yet, as she notes, many types of 
property crime also seem to have declined throughout the 
second half of the nineteenth century (1981, 37). Also, to say 
that the decline of violent crime demonstrates the accom-
modation of the urban population to the forces of modern-
ization perhaps begs the question rather than providing a 
true answer.
Also, we can probably reject more mechanistic implications 
of criminological opportunity theory – which assumes that 
the number of motivated offenders can be held constant and 
that crime levels are mainly influenced by the opportuni-
ties a society offers (Felson 1987). The reason is that several 
important potential drivers of violence in public space 
– income that can be spent on alcoholic beverages, low 
social control in anonymous city centres, and the amount 
of leisure time available for “risk” activities – certainly 
became more plentiful as the century progressed. A more 
complex argument about the effects of macro-level change 
on situational dynamics has been developed by Kick and 
LaFree (1985; also see LaFree and Kick 1986), who argue that 
modernization draws people outside the potentially conflic-
tive environment of the family and primary relations, hence 
reducing the likelihood of murder. Yet one should probably 
expect that such a dynamic would result primarily in the 
decline of family homicide, while the empirical data suggest 
that most of the drop occurred amongst young men fight-
ing each other.
Finally, there is little to suggest that increased state social 
control such as policing, deterrence, or imprisonment 
caused the sustained downturn in violent crime. Police 
forces did become larger and more professional from the 
1850s to the 1950s, but they were still small in comparison 
to the standards of the later part of the twentieth century 
when criminal violence soared. Also, the main trend in pu-
nitive policies during the period was towards less imprison-
ment (e.g. for England and Wales and the Netherlands see 
Downes 1989), less capital punishment, and more re-inte-
grative reformation (Emsley 2007; G. Rose 1961).
Ultimately, in my view, the most convincing explanation 
assumes a leading role of culture. What provides unity to 
the period from 1850 to 1950 and can plausibly explain the 
long-term decline in male-to-male public violence is the 
diffusion, throughout Europe, of a cultural model of the 
conduct of life, reinforced and reproduced through social 
institutions (Gay 2001). This model includes three main ele-
ments: an emphasis on self-control as an ideal of personality; 
domesticity and familialism as guidelines for private life; 
and respectability as the yardstick for public appearance. 
Self-control was probably the most pervasive element 
of the nineteenth century model of the conduct of life. 
It included the gospel of thriftiness, diligence, frugal-
ity, sobriety, order and, cleanliness. It was a theme that 
was reiterated by parents and teachers and resounded 
through schools, churches, labour unions, and the 
abundant advice literature (Gay 2001). It can be easily 
seen how and why self-control contributed to reduc-
ing male-to-male violence. For one, to the extent that 
self-restraint was inculcated in boys and young men 
through a variety of socializing institutions, their pro-
pensity to act impulsively in the face of provocation or 
frustration declined. Also, self-control was the guid-
ing theme behind the successful efforts to reduce the 
consumption of alcohol. In Sweden, per capita alcohol 
consumption halved between the 1860s and the 1930s 
(Willner 2001). Similarly, alcohol consumption fell 
significantly in Switzerland from the 1870s onwards, 
particularly the consumption of massive amounts of 
spirits amongst the working poor during weekends. 
Finally, as Wiener points out, forethought, reasonable-
ness, and command over oneself were the core qualities 
of the rising ideal of the “man of dignity” who replaced 
the older ideal of the “man of honor” (2004, 6). 
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The nineteenth-century devotion to domesticity was many 
things. Certainly it was an ideological tool to legitimate 
gender inequality and to confine women to the household. 
However, domesticity also fundamentally transformed no-
tions of masculinity (Tosh 1999). In particular, the ideal of 
a harmonious family life, reiterated in nineteenth-century 
advice literature, crucially included the notion that men 
and women should root their identities in the family and 
the upbringing of children. It emphasized that consistent 
and caring parenting was essential, that men should refrain 
from beating their wife or their children, and that they 
should devote their time outside work to promoting the 
happiness of the family.
The third element was respectability and fear of embarrass-
ment (e.g. Huggins 2000). Although related to self-control, 
respectability was more about the impression one made 
on other people. Importantly in the context of violence, 
respectability was the principal code that regulated interac-
tion in public places (Croll 1999). In particular, respectabil-
ity constrained behaviour in the expanding area of leisure 
time whether in middle class arenas such as seaside resorts 
and racing grounds, or working class activities such as foot-
ball or gymnastics (Walvin 1978).
Of course this model for conducting life was not a mono-
lithic phenomenon. It differed between classes, changed 
over the decades, and had varying nuances in the respective 
national discourses. However, it can easily be recognized as 
a distinctive code over the century, it powerfully moulded 
the working of social institutions such as schools and the 
family, and it effectively influenced the way people acted 
and expected to act in public space.
Finally, it seems worth mentioning as an aside that the 
decline in homicide cut through all the political faultlines 
and catastrophes of the century: it occurred similarly in 
democracies, monarchies, and authoritarian regimes; it 
continued through dramatic political change in the history 
of countries like Ireland, Italy, or Spain; and it also cut 
through the atrocities of the two world wars and the mass 
killings by the Nazi regime. This observation means – and 
this is a normative rather than a theoretical thought – that 
we should probably not equate declines in interpersonal 
criminal violence with civility in a wider normative sense. 
Disturbingly, populations in which fighting, feuding, and 
criminal killing are very unlikely can nonetheless support 
and engage in denunciation, deportation, and mass-killings 
(Goldhagen 1996; Johnson 2000). 
5. 1960 to 1993: The years of increase
By around 1955 the double trend of decline and convergence 
comes to a halt and for about a decade homicide levels 
are very low across Europe before they start to rise again. 
Before commenting on the increase and its possible causes 
it is useful to more closely examine the timing of the trend 
reversal and the overall extent of the increase. To this goal 
mean homicide rates were computed for each country, for 
all overlapping five-year periods after the end of World 
War II (i.e. 1950–54, 1951–55, 1952–56, etc.). In a next step the 
five-year periods with the lowest and the highest average 
homicide rates were identified. Averages were computed 
because they reduce the impact of annual fluctuations and 
thus give a clearer picture of the main pattern. Table 4 
shows the periods with the lowest and the highest homicide 
rates as well as the relative increase between the trough and 
the peak of the respective series.
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The data show that in each country a long-term low of ho-
micide rates was reached sometime between the early 1950s 
and the late 1960s, with a cluster of lower turning points 
between 1957 and 1966. During these years, several coun-
tries had sustained periods with rates significantly below 
0.5 per 100,000. This includes Norway (homicide rate of 0.35 
per 100,000, 1951–55), the Netherlands (0.32 per 100,000, 
1955–59), Ireland (0.34 per 100,000, 1955–59), and Denmark 
(0.49 per 100,000, 1958–62). Rates in Sweden, England, Scot-
land, and Switzerland were only marginally higher. 
These rates are quite remarkable. They represent the low-
est levels of criminal killing documented in Europe since 
the start of written records eight hundred years ago and 
may well be the lowest rates ever recorded anywhere in 
the world. To compare them with contemporary rates, one 
should additionally take into account that they include a 
comparatively large proportion of infanticides and were 
achieved with far less efficient medical technologies. Con-
sidering both factors, these rates probably correspond to a 
benchmark of about 0.2 non-infant homicides per 100,000. 
This is equal to roughly a fifth of current levels in western 
Europe and twenty times less than contemporary homicide 
rates in the United States (5.6 per 100,000 in 2006, see Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs). 
Although a handful of criminological studies have ex-
amined why some societies have little crime (Adler 1983; 
Clinard 1978), none appears to have looked at how these 
northern European countries managed to keep homi-
cide significantly below 0.5 per 100,000 during the 1950s. 
Based on the previous argument, my hypothesis is that 
its cornerstone was the successful generalization across 
class boundaries of a cultural model of conducting life that 
combined self-constraint, familialism, and the pursuit of 
respectability. Its corollaries were high integration and trust 
(Clinard 1978), a sense of civic responsibility embedded in 
moral individualism (Dicristina 2004; Durkheim 1957), and 
a system of reintegrative informal social control, possibly in 
part related to the relative smallness of the countries (Adler 
1983; Braithwaite 1989). Mortality statistics for this period 
show where this model made the biggest cuts: homicide 
rates for young male victims were as low as those for all 
Table 4: Lower and upper turning points of homicide rates, 1945–2004, sorted by homicide rate at lower turning point
Lower turning point Upper turning point Increase,
Year Rate Year Rate low to high
Netherlands 1957 0.32 1995 1.26 294%
Ireland 1957 0.34 2001 1.43 321%
Norway 1953 0.35 1989 1.30 271%
Denmark 1960 0.49 1994 1.26 157%
France 1953 0.55 1985 1.80 227%
Scotland 1955 0.56 1995 2.34 318%
England and Wales 1961 0.60 2003 1.69 182%
Belgium 1962 0.63 1996 1.82 189%
Sweden 1960 0.64 1991 1.38 116%
Switzerland 1968 0.64 1992 1.42 122%
Italy 1968 0.86 1991 2.26 163%
Germany 1955 0.94 1972 1.29  37%
Austria 1966 0.97 1985 1.50  55%
Finland 1966 2.04 1996 3.25  59%
Average 1960 0.71 1992 1.78 179%
Note: Lower turning point computed as the lowest average homicide rate over a five-year period, year shown is the middle year of the period.
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other age groups, while serious male-to-male violence was 
virtually absent.
But then things begin to change. From about 1960 onwards 
every series included in this analysis starts an upward trend 
that continues until the early 1990s (see also Thome and 
Birkel 2007). The average increase during this period was 
in the order of 100–150 percent, but the data in Table 4 also 
suggest a stronger surge in those countries that had the low-
est homicide rates in the 1950s or early 1960s. 
It is tempting to compare this increase to levels of deadly 
criminal violence in earlier centuries. This leads to the 
conclusion that a change from 0.7 to 1.4 killings per 100,000 
inhabitants is almost negligible if compared to rates of 
30–60 per 100,000 in the late Middle Ages (e.g. Eisner 2003; 
Spierenburg 2001). However, this is only true if count-
ing criminal killings is our sole interest. Yet if we think of 
homicide as an indicator for wider levels of violence, then 
long-term and short-term progress in technologies of heal-
ing should be borne in mind. In particular, wound treat-
ment with antiseptics (from about 1900), the use of antibi-
otics (from the 1940s), progress in the treatment of blood 
vessel injuries, and accelerated access to treatment thanks 
to better transportation reduced the lethality of injuries. 
This may be one of the reasons why homicides increased 
less than other indicators of criminal violence. For robbery, 
for example, things are more dramatic. Consider Figure 
2, which shows trends in police recorded robbery rates for 
England and Wales, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy. 
Figure 5: Robbery rates per 100,000 population for five European countries
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Sources
England and Wales: Police recorded robbery, Home Office, ed. Criminal Statistics, various years.
Sweden: Police recorded robbery, Nordic Criminal Statistics (Hofer 2003b).
Denmark: Police recorded robbery, Nordic Criminal Statistics (Hofer 2003b).
Italy: Police recorded robbery, Istituto Nationale di Statistica (2004)
Switzerland: Convictions for robbery, Canton of Zurich only (Eisner 1992).
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The figure illustrates that robbery was largely unknown in 
European cities throughout the second half of the nine-
teenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. 
But since the early 1960s the number of police recorded rob-
beries has exploded. Maybe this can in part be attributed to 
more reporting and better recording, but a large proportion 
certainly reflects a real change that is unparalleled in the 
history of modern European society. 
Even more than during the period before 1950, the course 
of homicide rates is essentially a phenomenon in which 
the boundaries of nation states are all but irrelevant. As far 
as homicide is concerned, the “European unification” is 
already complete by 1950. One way to express this similarity 
statistically is to compute the amount of variance in na-
tional series that is represented by the joint European trend. 
Respective figures show that with two exceptions (Finland 
and France, the latter because of the increased levels of 
homicide during the Algerian War) about 40–60 percent of 
the variation are represented by the joint trend. 
But the mere similarity in overall trends is not the only 
thing that is common across all countries. There is also 
sweeping correspondence in the types of homicide that 
became more frequent. Again, detailed mortality data prove 
to be helpful. They show that the increase was an increase 
in male victimization rather than female victimization and 
particularly an increase amongst younger people. To il-
lustrate these changes Figure 6 shows the age distribution of 
male and female non-infant victims of homicide in England 
and Wales during the 1950s and the 1990s. 
Figure 6: Homicide victimization rates by age in 1950–59 and 1990–99, England and Wales, non-infant death
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Notice, first, that the age curve during the 1950s was 
characterized by the virtual absence of any peak during 
early adulthood and no gender difference in the victimiza-
tion risk. By the 1990s, this had changed dramatically. The 
increase was stronger for male than for female victims and 
more pronounced for young adults. Amongst men aged 
20–40, the risk of being a victim of criminal homicide 
rose five- to sevenfold during this period. Corroborating 
evidence comes from the Criminal Statistics of England and 
Wales (Home Office, various years), which since 1969 have 
included tables on the relationship between offender and 
victim. They show revealing differences: A moderate de-
cline in family homicide, a moderate increase in homicides 
against acquaintances, and a massive eightfold surge in 
homicides against strangers (from about fifty cases around 
1970 to about 400 cases around 2000. For a similar finding 
in Stockholm see Wikström 1992).
This leaves us with the conclusion that the notion of 
increasing violence since the early 1960s misses the point. 
Rather, disaggregation reveals different trends for different 
types of violence (for a similar observation see Blumstein 
and Rosenfeld 1998): Across Europe infanticide continued 
to decrease throughout the period; also, family homicides 
did not increase and probably were slightly decreasing; what 
soared dramatically, though, were killings that involved 
men, predominantly in public space. One may think of 
fights between youth gangs, armed robberies, conflicts be-
tween drug addicts ending in a knife being pulled, or simple 
pub brawls going wrong.
There are certainly gaps in the data presented here. But 
despite undeniable shortcomings they suggest a remarkable 
symmetry between the decline in 1850–1950 and the in-
crease from about 1960–1990. While the decrease occurred 
mainly because fewer men killed each other in public space, 
the surge since the 1960s primarily resulted from soaring 
numbers of young men getting killed in public space by 
people they hardly knew.
Interpretive issues. This descriptive summary leads back 
to the question of plausible explanations: what could have 
caused the almost simultaneous rise, across Europe, of 
lethal violence between young men? Let me again start by 
eliminating a number of candidates. 
First, it seems difficult to see how any version of depriva-
tion theory could work. Take the example of Jock Young’s 
Exclusive Society (1999), one of the most elaborate attempts 
at explaining the increase of crime in late modernity from 
a structural perspective. Basically, Young argues that the 
increase was linked to the “crisis” of the post-war “Fordist” 
regime of production, which had provided stable employ-
ment combined with a welfare state that furnished social 
protection “from the cradle to the grave”. That model was 
replaced by a post-Fordist mode of production character-
ized by unstable employment for many, a devaluation of 
manual labour, increasing disparities in income distribu-
tion, and a dismantling of the welfare state. It created social 
exclusion, which, in turn, propagated frustration, resent-
ment, and reactive violence on the part of the excluded (for 
a critical discussion see Yar and Penna 2004). 
There are several problems with this argument. First, it 
implies a degree of stability and inclusion of the “Fordist” 
regime that hardly stands up to historical scrutiny. If any-
thing, late nineteenth and early twentieth century workers 
were significantly less protected from the vagaries of eco-
nomic change than late twentieth century working classes, 
yet nonetheless homicide continued to decline through 
the protracted Long Depression of 1873–96 and the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Also, why did violence and crime 
start to increase more than a decade before the first oil 
crisis of 1973, which triggered a deep economic crisis across 
the world economy? Finally, increasing social inequality 
and the dismantling of the welfare state since the late 1970s 
were very much phenomena linked to the political history 
of the United Kingdom and the United States, but violence 
similarly increased in Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland, 
where there is no evidence for increasing income inequal-
ity and where the welfare state remained intact – or was 
extended – during the relevant period (Alderson 2002).
Another group of explanations attributes the increase 
of criminal violence to an “excess” of modernity, mean-
ing that violence is caused by the pathologies of modern 
society. There are materialist and culturalist versions of 
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this argument. The scholar best known for the material-
ist version is Charles Murray (1984, 1994). He basically 
argues that the expansion of the welfare state symbolized 
by the Kennedy years in the United States started to give 
away too much to too many. The consequence was that a 
dependency culture developed, that the work ethic eroded, 
and that family values crumbled. Over the years this led to 
the growth of a socially irresponsible “underclass”, whose 
growth is visible through two main indicators: the rise in 
violent crime amongst young men and the rise of illegiti-
mate births among young women. The problem with this 
argument is that there was a lot of variation – over time and 
between countries – in the expansion of the welfare state 
since the 1950s while the trends in homicide rates are so sur-
prisingly similar. Also, it is hard to see why the rise of the 
“underclass” should only have affected street violence while 
domestic homicides probably continued to decline. 
The culturalist version is essentially about too much indi-
vidualism, too much materialism, and too much egoism. 
Two well-known versions are Crime and the American 
Dream by Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) and The Great Dis-
ruption by Fukuyama (1999). Similarly, Thome and Birkel 
(2007) have recently argued that over the past decades 
structural factors have promoted a disintegrative indi-
vidualism at the expense of an older model of cooperative 
individualism. 
The Great Disruption is particularly interesting in this 
context because there is some overlap with the argument 
developed here. Fukuyama correctly observes that the 
simultaneous rise in indicators of crime and violence across 
all Western societies precludes explanations that rely on na-
tional politics. I also concur with his analysis that depriva-
tion-based explanations are implausible. And I agree with 
him that the decay of the Victorian model of selfhood based 
on restraint, domesticity, and respect was an important ele-
ment in the story and that it contributed to the increase in 
male-on-male violence since the early 1960s.
However, I believe Fukuyama is imprecise in what he 
identifies as the underlying cultural shift. Informed by the 
communitarian ideas developed by Etzioni (1993) Fukuy-
ama argues that the “great disruption” was caused by a 
dramatic swing towards “excessive” individualism that 
corroded virtually all forms of authority and weakened 
the bonds holding together families, neighbourhoods, and 
nations. Conceptually, however, the notion of “excessive” 
individualism remains vague and the empirical question of 
how much individualism is “excessive” is unanswered. Also, 
why it should lead to more crime and violence is rather 
unclear. For example, Fukuyama sees the main character-
istic of excessive individualism in the “preoccupation with 
one’s private life and family” to the detriment of engage-
ment in public affairs, hardly the standard characteristics 
that criminologists would associate either with parents of 
problematic adolescents or with people at risk of commit-
ting violent offences. However, there is no doubt that the 
period of the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a fundamental 
shift in culturally transmitted values that fundamentally 
altered views about how to conduct life and how to interact 
in public space. 
There are two concepts in the toolbox of cultural sociol-
ogy that may be better able to capture the nature of this 
transition. Both have been developed in and with a view 
to the United States, but both describe the cultural shift 
equally well in Europe. The first is the notion of a transi-
tion from the “inner-directed” to the “outer-directed” 
character developed by Daniel Riesman. In his best-selling 
book The Lonely Crowd – first published in 1950 – Riesman 
documented the transition from the ideal inner-directed 
self, deeply rooted in the commitment to work and occu-
pation, to an imagery of the outer-directed self associated 
with affluent society. The outer-directed self is dependent 
on the opinion of others, is anxious to be loved and ac-
cepted, needs excitement, pleasure and consumption to find 
fulfillment. This pessimistic story of the “lonely crowd” 
reunited in mass consumption is retold in many sociologi-
cal accounts of the changing conception of the self in the 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Most prominent are the 
accounts offered by Bell (1976), Sennett (1977), and Lash 
(1978). Although arguing from different theoretical vantage 
points, these authors come to the conclusion that the inner-
directed, self-contained, and disciplined self has rapidly 
vanished and lost its significance as the guiding cultural 
ideal. According to their views, the cultural notion of the 
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self as endowed with character has been corroded (Sennett 
1998) giving way to the glorification of fluid identity.
The other element that begins its rise in the cultural land-
scape of the 1950s is what Bellah et al. (1985) called expres-
sive individualism. Its core element is self-actualization, 
the goal of expressing one’s own unique nature, emotions, 
and desires, while at the same time reducing the emphasis 
on observing society’s rules and constraining one’s own 
impulses. They argue that the cultural model of the ex-
pressive self greatly emphasizes the deeper expression and 
cultivation of the self, which articulates the inner world of 
feelings and emotions, emphasizing virtues such as sensitiv-
ity, emotionality, authenticity, openness, and empathy. In 
a similar vein, but with even more obvious ties to crimi-
nological thinking, Turner (1976) argued in the mid 1970s 
that the dominant cultural code of the self has shifted from 
what he labels the “institutional self” to the “impulsive 
self”, making the potential link to our theme even more 
evident. Under the institutional locus of the self, the real self 
is revealed only when the individual is in full control of its 
faculties and behaviours. Rules that govern interaction in 
public space are as perceived resources and failure to adhere 
exposes moral imperfection. Under the cultural code of 
the impulsive self, in contrast, institutions are external, 
artificial constraints and the true self is revealed only when 
inhibitions are lowered or abandoned (Turner 1976, 993). 
Many of these broad cultural shifts are well documented 
empirically, although there are hardly any quantitative 
indicators. They are evident, for example, in the rapid 
spread of distinct youth subcultures across Europe starting 
in the mid 1950s (Fyvel 1966; Kurme 2006; Marvick 1998). 
It is amongst the teddy boys, mods, rockers and hippies 
where the rise of an expressive self seeking for true fulfil-
ment outside the oppressive rules of society and anchored 
in excitement, consumption, and pleasure finds its purest 
expression. The gang in A Clockwork Orange – written by 
Anthony Burgess in 1962 – that commits crime for pure 
enjoyment epitomizes this new culture. It is certainly not 
primarily individualistic. Quite to the contrary it appears, 
from the vantage point of the moral individualism that 
Durkheim had in mind, primarily anti-individualistic, con-
doning masculinity and its code of honour – a remarkable 
return to some patterns that were associated with violence 
around 120 years before.
Epilogue: 1993 to present – Back to the civilizing trend?
It is well known that in the United States the year 1992 
constitutes a major turning-point as regards the frequency 
of homicide. In 1992, the United States experienced a peak 
rate of about 10 homicides per 100,000 including particu-
larly high victimization rates among teens and young adults 
(Blumstein 2000). Since then the United States have expe-
rienced a much-debated decline in violent crime including 
a drop in homicide rates by more than 40 percent and a 
current rate of about 5.6 per 100,000 (roughly five times the 
current average rates in most western European countries). 
However, while the crime drop in the United States has re-
ceived a lot of public and academic attention (e.g. Blumstein 
and Wallman 2000), few observers have noticed that a very 
similar change has occurred in Europe. Consider the data 
shown in Table 4 above. They demonstrate that in many Eu-
ropean countries homicide rates also reached a peak in the 
late 1980s or early 1990s and that the mean year of the upper 
turning point is precisely the same as in the United States, 
namely 1992. Since then, homicide rates in most European 
countries have been falling, in some cases quite dramati-
cally. In Austria, the mortality statistics suggest a fall in the 
homicide rate by 62 percent from 1.49 in 1992 to 0.55 in 2003. 
Germany had a similar decline from 1.18 in 1992 to 0.63 in 
2003. Italy counted over 1,600 violent deaths in 1991 (ho-
micide rate of 2.84 per 100,000) dropping to a mere 550 in 
2001, a decline by over 60 percent (Piacenti 2005). Declining 
trends can also be found in France, Switzerland, Portugal, 
and across Scandinavian countries, while the British Isles 
with increases continuing in England and Wales, Scotland, 
and Ireland are the major exception.
It is tempting to extrapolate the interpretive sketch devel-
oped on the preceding pages to this most recent change in 
the long evolution of homicide rates. Especially as we are 
looking at a phenomenon that transcends national borders 
yet again. The years between 1990 and 1993 were a water-
shed as regards homicide rates across the Western world. 
They started declining in the United States, but they did the 
same across much of Europe with the notable exception of 
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the United Kingdom and Ireland. Similarly, homicides rates 
have been declining since the late 1980s in Australia (from 
a peak of 2.3 in 1989 to 1.3 in 2005, see Mountzos 2003) and 
in Canada (from 2.6 in 1992 to 1.8 in 2004). The extent of de-
cline differed and it is relevant to ask why these differences 
exist. But this does not detract from the main argument 
developed throughout this paper, namely that the primary 
unit of analysis for the kind of questions addressed in this 
paper must be the Western world. Also, I find many of the 
more conventional explanations offered in the criminologi-
cal literature rather unconvincing. The similarity of trends 
across the Western world, for example, makes discussions of 
how the merits or faults of American criminal policy caused 
the drop in violence look rather parochial (Blumstein and 
Wallman 2000). Finally, the recent drop in homicide does 
not line up well with economic success or failure. Homicide 
rates continued to increase over the last fifteen years in Eng-
land, Scotland and Ireland, where unemployment dropped 
significantly, while homicide went down in France and Ger-
many where unemployment levels remained high. 
Wherever the decline occurred, my guess is that it was 
primarily a decline in male-to-male homicides between 
strangers or acquaintances. And my favourite candidate for 
explaining the downturn would again be culture, the only 
phenomenon that travels fast enough to affect such vast 
areas roughly simultaneously. More specifically, I would 
look out for a manifest shift in culturally embedded images 
of conducting life, for example, in changed ideas of how to 
bring up children well. Such change is visible, for example, 
in the resurgence of good parenting as a major domain of 
prevention research and policy, in a partial shift of parent-
ing values towards re-emphasizing self-control and respect, 
it can be traced in changed attitudes towards drugs, which 
have lost their revolutionary aura, and it is manifest in a 
greater emphasis on discipline, respect, and responsibility 
as guiding principles in primary and secondary education. 
Conclusions
The main interest of this paper was whether an explicit 
macro-level and long-term perspective can add anything 
to the question of what caused the increase in criminal 
violence in most European countries during the second half 
of the twentieth century. Looking at trends over 160 years 
for up to sixteen countries this study found three broad em-
pirical patterns that have a bearing on the range of plausible 
generalizing explanations.
First, the findings suggest that very low rates of homicide 
found across most of Europe during the late 1950s, when 
the period of sustained increase begins, should probably be 
seen as a rather exceptional phenomenon. Any attempt at 
explaining the trend of increasing violent crime from the 
early 1960s onwards thus probably needs to entail some un-
derstanding of how the uniquely low homicide levels of the 
1950s came about. The findings presented in this paper sug-
gest that they may have emerged as the result of a century-
long dynamic that probably started in around 1850, can be 
summarized as the twin trend of decline and convergence, 
and was surprisingly unaffected by major economic crises 
or the political catastrophes of a very troubled century.
Secondly, the data presented in this paper suggest that some 
previous explanatory approaches may have significantly 
overestimated the importance of national-level endogenous 
forces such as national welfare and criminal justice poli-
cies or the national specificities of demographic change and 
migration patterns. More specifically, this study found that 
both the lower and the upper turning points in violence 
trends across Europe were surprisingly synchronized with 
many national series only deviating a few years from the 
mean year of the lower (1960) and the upper (1992) turn-
ing points. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the early 
1990s emerge as an upper turning point in homicide rates 
– followed by at least ten years of sometimes significant 
decline – not only in Europe, but also in the United States, 
in Canada, and in Australia. Highlighting these surpris-
ing similarities does not imply that nation states and their 
political idiosyncrasies are completely irrelevant. However, 
the findings presented in this paper do favour an analytic 
perspective that gives logical precedence to the temporal 
variation that is shared within large geo-cultural units (e.g. 
north-western Europe in the nineteenth century, affluent 
Western societies since the 1950s, etc.) and then considers 
nation-states as special cases within a broader picture.
Thirdly, this paper presented additional evidence on an 
empirical regularity initially found by Verkko (1967) whose 
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theoretical significance may not yet have been fully appreci-
ated. More specifically, analyses of victim characteristics 
suggest that an over-proportional part of the decline in 
homicide rates during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century may have been due to a reduction in the deaths of 
young men, and that, symmetrically, an over-proportional 
part of the increase since the late 1950s was due to an up-
surge in killings of young men. Although more thorough 
data would need to be collected to fully document this 
pattern this paper hypothesizes that most of the long-term 
variation in overall homicide rates is due to male-on-male 
conflicts in public space. If confirmed by more data, this 
would suggest that a theoretical explanation of the increas-
ing levels of criminal violence would need to focus on how 
Western societies regulated the interaction between young 
men in public space.
Overall, this paper thus suggests that an elegant theory of 
the increase in deadly interpersonal violence during the 
second half of the twentieth century should also be able to 
account for the declining trend that prevailed through most 
of Europe during the century before 1950, that it should be 
able to explain the coincidence in lower and upper turn-
ing points across the continent and beyond; and it should 
be able to elucidate the disproportional contribution of 
conflicts between young men to the grand fluctuations in 
homicide rates. 
Of course, there are many possible theories that can ac-
count for these three observations. This paper tentatively 
suggests a perspective that builds on Max Weber’s notion of 
culturally embedded models of Lebensführung, reinforced 
and reproduced through social institutions. It proposes 
linking the major fluctuations in homicide rates to change 
in norms and expectations about how young men interact 
in public space. But without any doubt such a suggestion 
paves the way to many new questions, unaddressed in this 
paper, not the least of which is whether such a theoretical 
perspective could be moved beyond the level of speculation 
and be subjected to more rigorous empirical tests.
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Appendix
Data Sources
This appendix documents the main data used for the His-
tory of Violence Database and the respective sources.
Austria. There is a series of convictions for completed 
murder and manslaughter from 1862–1887 based on tables 
in the Österreichisches Statistisches Jahrbuch and published 
in Bosco (1889). From 1924 to 1936 I use the data published 
in Hacker (1938) that are also based on conviction statistics. 
From 1947 onwards data are based on the death statistics as 
published in the WHO tables.
Belgium. From 1870 onwards the Annuaire Statistique de la 
Belgique has published the number of victims of homicide 
as counted in the national death statistics. From 1980 data 
are based on the WHO death statistics (identical to the 
national death statistics).
England and Wales. England and Wales have two major na-
tional systems for registering homicides, namely the causes 
of death statistics and the police statistics. Except for minor 
divergences both series have always been very close.
For the total homicide rates displayed in Figure 1 through 
5 I rely from 1857 on the number of police recorded homi-
cides. Gattrell (1980) presents an earlier series of homicide 
rates covering the period 1834–56. For the period from 1967 
onwards the data used here refer to the number of cases 
“initially recorded as homicide”. A proportion of these cases 
will eventually be found not to have been a homicide and 
the Home Office statistics regularly update their data base 
as to the final outcome of the police investigation. However, 
the series of initially recorded homicides seemed to be more 
compatible with the data covering the period before 1967.
The figures for victims of intentional killing by sex and age 
group have been published in the Annual Report of the Reg-
istrar General since 1857 (Registrar General, 1837ff). 
Furthermore, the National Crime Statistics publications 
regularly include a separate section with detailed analyses 
of the circumstances of homicides and the demographic 
backgrounds of offenders and victims.
Finland. Finland and Sweden have the oldest national 
causes of death statistics in the world, going back to 1754. 
The data on infanticides and male and female non-infant 
victims for 1754–1944 were published by Verkko (1951). Data 
for subsequent years up to 2003 are also based on national 
death statistics compiled by Statistics Finland and made 
available to me by Martti Lehti (e.g. Lehti 2001).
Germany. The earliest series used here is the series pub-
lished by Starke (1884) on persons accused of murder, 
manslaughter or infanticide in Prussia from 1854 to 1873 
(which is virtually identical to the series presented by Ferri 
in L’omicidio-suicidio). From 1873 to 1914 I use the number 
of homicides recorded in the causes-of-death statistics for 
Prussia. Johnson (1995) published the full series up to 1914. 
Data since 1947 are based in the national causes of death 
statistics published in the WHO volumes. There is a gap in 
the series between 1914 and 1947. 
Ireland. O’Donnell (2004) has done pioneering work on the 
development of homicide and infanticide rates in Ireland, 
discussing, inter alia, the various sources and possible 
methodological problems. The series is based on various 
sources but primarily relies on crimes known to the police 
from 1841–1919 and 1947–2003 while relying on the Registrar 
General’s mortality statistics for 1935–1946. I am grateful 
to Jan O’Donnell for having given me access to the data. 
Data include a separate series on infanticides and a series of 
non-infant deaths. The “homicide” series used here includes 
both.
Italy. Italy has a complete series of police recorded homi-
cides called “Delitti denunciati per i quali l’Autorita giudi-
ziaria ha iniziato l’azione penale” published in the Italian 
justice statistics. An overview for 1872–1955 can be found in 
the Summary of Historical Statistics by the Istituto Centrale 
di Statistica (Istituto Centrale di Statistica, 1958). Later years 
are recorded in the annual judicial statistics (Istituto Na-
zionale di Statistica, 2000) It should be borne in mind that 
this series also includes attempted homicides. 
To correct for inflated levels of the police statistics I also 
collected a series of homicide victims as recorded in the 
national causes of death statistics and reported in the WHO 
publications. Comparison of the death statistics and the 
police statistics for the 1947 to 2000 period suggest that both 
series are highly correlated (r=0.90). A regression analysis 
316IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 288 – 316Manuel Eisner: Modernity Strikes Back? A Historical Perspective on the Latest Increase in Interpersonal Violence (1960–1990)
revealed that the police series includes 59 percent attempts 
and that this fraction has remained basically stable over the 
comparison period. I hence decided to use the police series 
over the whole period but to correct for the inclusion of 
attempts by multiplying by a constant conversion factor of 
0.41 over the whole period.
France. France has national causes of death statistics with 
separate figures on homicide from 1925 onwards. Detailed 
data by sex and age category are available online at http://
www.ined.fr/bdd/causfra/intro.html (accessed 24 April 
2006) and are discussed by Vallin and Meslé (1996). Data 
for 1827–1920 are based on the number of accusations at the 
cours des assises and can be found in the Compte general de 
l’administration de la justice criminelle en France (Ministère 
de la Justice 1832–1930). For the total number of homicides 
I rely on the series complied and published by Ferri (1925). 
The series includes the total number of cases referring to 
murder (meurtre), manslaughter (assassinat), parenticide 
(parricide), poisoning (empoisonnement), infanticide, and 
assault leading to death. For cases of infanticide there is a 
separate series of cases adjudicated by the cours des assises 
covering the years 1826–1963 published in.
Netherlands. From 1900 to 1930 I relied on the convictions 
for homicide series presented by Archer and Gartner (1984). 
From 1931 onwards the data used here are based on causes-
of-death statistics as presented in the National Statistical 
Yearbook and published by the World Health Organisation. 
For the period between 1931 and 1972 I also compared both 
series. Excluding the periods of war (1942–1945) the correla-
tion between both series is 0.74, suggesting a fair validity of 
the conviction data.
Norway. The data for Norway are based on the national 
death statistics. From 1876 to 1914 numbers broken down 
by the sex of the victim were published in the Statistical 
Yearbook Norway published by the Office of Statistics. From 
1915 to 1980 I currently only have the grand total. From 1980 
onwards data are based on the WHO statistics and broken 
down by sex of the victim.
Scotland. The series used here is based on the Criminal 
Statistics for Scotland (known as Judicial Statistics before 
1898), for 1847 onwards and refers to the number of com-
pleted homicides (murder and culpable homicide) recorded 
by the police authorities (Home Office 1868ff; for recent 
overviews see, e.g., Scottish Executive 2005). Like the statis-
tics produced by the Home Office for England and Wales, 
the Scottish data distinguish between “initially recorded” 
and “currently recorded” counts since 1978. I use the series 
of “initially” recorded crimes for comparability with earlier 
periods. 
Spain. The current series for Spain has major gaps. For 
the 1883–1911 period I rely on the series published by Ferri 
(1925) and based on the Spanish Judicial Statistics. I then 
have a series of data based on national death statistics from 
1950–2003, originating from the WHO tables. 
Sweden. Sweden has the oldest national series of causes-of-
death statistics starting in 1754. Series up to 1944 are pre-
sented in Verkko (1951). Data for subsequent years are based 
on the data published in the Swedish Statistical Yearbook 
and the World Health Organisation data. The data have 
been previously discussed by Hofer (1991; 2003a).
Switzerland. Switzerland has had a national registry of 
causes of death since 1876. Unpublished tables by the Swiss 
National Office of Statistics include the number of homicide 
victims by sex and age group for the period before 1950. 
For the 1950–2002 period data can also by found in the 
WHO yearbooks. Killias (1991) first analysed Swiss homi-
cide trends, Bieri (1998) has examined the data quality and 
analysed the demographic structure of the victims. 
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